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Abstract
Recent achievements of social sciences, in particular of economics, social
psychology and sociology, have largely contributed to unveiling and analyzing
what makes people happy. Several studies, for example, have been assessing
and finding consistent results about the importance of marital and employment
status, income, positional concerns, adaptation, environmental conditions,
religion, ageing and sex for people’s well-being (Powdthavee, 2010). More
recently, further research documented that social capital - defined as “networks
together with shared norms, values and understandings that facilitate co-
operation within or among groups” - is also an important dimension of people’s
well-being (Helliwell, 2002, 2008; Uhlaner, 1989). This large body of research
provided extensive knowledge about the ingredients of happiness and proved
that both happiness and its determinants can be compared across countries and
time (Sarracino, 2012). This contribution intends to build on this lit...
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Abstract
Recent achievements of social sciences have largely contributed to un-
veiling and analyzing what makes people happy. Present work builds
on this literature to complement the existing explanations of the 2008
economic crisis. Even though the causes of this shock have been widely
debated, a fundamental question still remains unanswered: what pushed
Americans – the most aﬄuent society in the world – to finance their con-
sumption by accumulating an enormous debt? An exhaustive explanation
of the origins of the crisis demands an account of what drives individuals
to bulimic consumption sacrificing collective infrastructure, environmen-
tal and social assets, human relations and leisure in economies that grow
more aﬄuent and productive. Hence, we investigate the relational com-
ponent of people’s well-being as one of the social conditions that led to
the onset of the 2008 economic crisis. Our aim is to contribute to the
development of an early warning system to anticipate as much as possible
the risk of a new economic shock. Our conclusions confirm that people’s
well-being asks not only for material needs, but also for further aspects
coming from the delicate connection of human relationships with others
and with the surrounding environment. Neglecting these aspects reduces
people’s well-being and increases the quest for material consumption.
1 Introduction
Five years ago the outburst of the economic crisis and its sudden contagion of the
real economy shocked the world population and dramatically affected the lives
of millions of people. Now that the coping strategies to deal with the emergency
have been adopted and that the deep instability and fragility of the economic
system scare less, the time has come to understand what caused the crisis and
to set-up strategies to prevent such catastrophes from happening again.
There are no doubts that the crisis originated from the interaction of easy
credit to consumers, new financial tools and poor institutional and regulatory
framework. These factors contributed on one side to the steep increase in the
price of assets – such as houses and shares – feeding a deep speculative bubble, on
the other – to the opaqueness of the financial markets. To minimize the damages
of possible default of high risk clients, banks adopted financial innovations –
such as the derivatives – to split credit risks across bonds so that, in case of
default, losses are spread over a large number of actors. However, when many
Americans became unable to repay their debts, financial operators realized that
it was impossible to tell the good bonds from the “toxic” ones. Hence, the real
estate bubble together with the opacity of the financial markets resulted in a
drastic contraction of the investors’ confidence and in credit crunch. In this way
the financial crisis affected the “real” economy with all its well-known dramatic
consequences for people’s well-being, such as rising unemployment, trade and
business collapse, and high interest rates.
Besides the hard-core defenders of the “business as usual” scenario, who be-
lieve that economic crises are moments of “creative destruction” that will result
in renovated economic growth, analysts agree that, to prevent similar events
from happening again, it is necessary to restructure the international financial
markets adopting new and more stringent rules. However, this approach cures
the symptoms of the disease rather than its causes. For example, the European
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Stability Fund and the measures alike aim at protecting countries from the risk
of bankruptcy – they tend to minimize the consequences – but not to prevent
the event from happening again. Moreover, even though the adoption of institu-
tional reforms is urgently needed, its implementation is uncertain. This is why
analysts still fear a new shock.
The problem is that if we do not understand the mechanisms leading to the
creation of such bubbles, any effort might be vane. Speculative bubbles grow
and get nourished in an environment with a poor institutional frame and weak
controls, but at their root are people’s behaviours. If we do not understand the
deep reasons and behavioural mechanisms that induced the creation of the huge
American speculative bubble, we will miss to fully understand its origins and
changing the institutional frame might not be enough to avoid new crisis.
Since at the root of the American financial bubble stayed the huge private
debt of American families, it is necessary to understand what pushed the Amer-
icans – the most aﬄuent society in the world – to finance their consumption by
accumulating an enormous debt. In other words, the unanswered question is
what pushed the Americans to get indebted to finance their already conspicuous
consumption (Roberts, 2011).
What is even more unsettling is that the consumption boom happened in a
period when many forces were pushing towards the cutting of American expen-
diture. The first one was the loss of competitiveness of the American economy
which obliged the American industry to either de-localize or to downsize to stay
on the market.1 This resulted in moving to foreign manufacturers part of the
American incomes thus reducing the national purchasing power. The second
force was the increase in income inequality which produced a polarization of
the American society and squeezed the middle class, the driving force of mass
consumption. These transformations should have resulted in a compression of
the consumption power of American consumers, but this did not happen: the
excessive consumption increased over time, as illustrated in fig. 1 (Jagannathan
et al., 2009). Over the last 25 years the American consumption has been steadily
increasing and, in these conditions, it could only be financed by getting indebted.
And this is what happened (see fig. 2 and 3).
This is why to understand the origins of the crisis of 2008 we need to under-
stand why the Americans chose to work and consume beyond their possibilities
rather than, for instance, devoting themselves to leisure time and the things
they love. It is remarkable that, even though the majority of Americans declare
to love and care for their families, they choose to spend very limited time with
the people they love (Pettigrew, 2005).
The recent development of the studies on subjective well-being allows to go
beyond the current interpretations of the crisis and to consider the human be-
haviours that are on the back of markets. In particular, Bartolini et al. (2012b)
proposed an explanation in relational terms of the American bulimic consump-
tion that pushes consumers to sacrifice collective infrastructure, environmental
and societal assets, human relationships and leisure in economies that grow
more aﬄuent and productive. Even though such explanation fits well the ev-
idence from the U.S., it has a general validity. Indeed, it is grounded on a
1The American trade balance – imports over exports – significantly worsened during the
last 20 years. In 1996 the trade deficit was US$ 1006 per household, whereas in 2000 it
amounted to US$ 3787 and in 2007 it reached US$ 6194 per household (Jagannathan et al.,
2009).
3
Figure 1: U.S. Private Consumption and Total Wages∗
∗Private consumption and total wages, including benefits (right axis) along
with excess consumption calculated as private consumption less total wages
(left axis). All numbers are in 1980 $ per household
Source: Jagannathan et al. (2009)
Figure 2: Average US Household Residential Leverage∗
∗Average US household residential leverage computed as household debt
divided by wage
Source: Jagannathan et al. (2009)
4
Figure 3: Average household credit card debt∗
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model of economic growth (NEG) which explains economic growth as the out-
come of the erosion of common and free goods, such as social relationships and
environmental goods.2 As we will show in section 2.2, this interpretation has
been corroborated in a variety of settings, including developed and developing
countries. Moreover, a NEG type of economic growth can take more or less ex-
treme forms. For example, some of the predictions of the NEG model concern,
at different degrees, also various European countries. From this point of view
Great Britain shows many symptoms compatible with a NEG type of economic
growth, while Scandinavian countries seem to be much less affected.
This paper builds on previous studies to provide a consistent interpretation
of the crisis of 2008. The value added of our work is to contribute to the devel-
opment of an early warning system to anticipate as much as possible the risk of
a new economic shock. Our hypothesis is that a NEG type model of economic
growth features some aspects, such as the trends of well-being, of materialism,
of social capital, that can accompany the on-set of a crisis. We argue that
such specific aspects should be consistently monitored across countries to in-
form about those situations where the NEG mechanism reaches worrying levels.
Our point differs from previous attempts to predict the crisis for two reasons:
the first is that the few analysts who correctly anticipated the devastating ef-
fects of the default of the subprimes did so at the end of 2007, i.e. when it was
already too late to prevent the crisis from happening (Roubini, 2008, 2007b,a).
Our idea is to provide a framework to identify well in advance which are the
2For more details on the Negative Endogenous Growth model (NEG) please refer to section
2.1.
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countries where the symptoms of a crisis are growing to adopt policies to pre-
vent the crisis from happening. The second reason is that other analysts refered
only to financial mechanisms to explain how the crisis would have evolved. This
account is pivotal, but it can not anticipate the crisis. On the contrary, we focus
on long-term trends of various social dimensions to identify those social changes
that could facilitate the on-set of a speculative bubble and therefore of a new
crisis. In other words, we analyze the deep social causes that are behind the
crisis of 2008 and we interpret them in a consistent framework to build a sort
of “thermometer”, an early warning system.
The following section is dedicated to the explanation of the American con-
sumption bulimia. It is divided in two subsections: in subsection 2.1, we de-
scribe the theoretical mechanisms to explain people’s consumption choice and
introduce the Negative Endogenous Growth (NEG) model; in subsection 2.2,
we review the evidence supporting the NEG model and its predictions. The
overall message of section 2 is that it is possible to identify a set of indicators
to monitor people’s behaviour which can supplement economic tools to build an
early warning system. Section 3 compares the trends of these indicators across
various countries to monitor people’s behaviour and values. The last section
summarizes our findings and suggests the direction for future research.
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2 How did it happen?
Why have Americans consumed beyond their possibilities even though they were
already the wealthiest people in the world? The literature on consumer’s choice
provides some hints in this regard.
A plausible and largely explored hypothesis concerns the idea of a “tread-
mill”. According to this hypothesis people compare their achievements with
what they already achieved and with what others, the so-called reference group,
achieve. In the first case, people adjust their aspirations to their previous con-
sumption levels, quickly become dissatisfied with what they got, and need to
push their consumption further. This theory is usually referred to as “adapta-
tion” (Brickman and Campbell, 1971).
A similar mechanism is supposed to operate when people compare their
achievements with those of others. These “others” represent a benchmark for
the average consumers, a reference group – a group of people whom they want to
resemble. A typical example are neighbours or colleagues at work. This mech-
anism, known as “social comparisons” (theory developed by Festinger, 1954),
sets a “rat-race” forcing people to pursue higher levels of consumption just to
keep up with their reference group (Frank, 1997).
Both adaptation and social comparisons are well established and widely ex-
plored theories (Brickman et al., 1978; Frederick and Loewenstein, 1999; Diener
et al., 2006; Frank, 2007), however, they do not provide any explanation con-
cerning the origins of the preferences and values that push people to pursue a
“rat-race”. Without these mechanisms, it is still impossible to understand what
pushed Americans to their bulimic consumption. A more general hypothesis,
largely shared in psychological literature, suggests that people are subject to
cognitive limits (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974).
The psychological literature provided several proofs demonstrating that peo-
ple are not rational and are not free to fully choose and pursue what maximizes
their utility (Schwarz and Strack, 1999; Kahneman and Krueger, 2006b; Kahne-
man, 2011). In other words, people exhibit “bounded rationality” that pushes
them to pursue fake needs which constitute the are standards in their social
environment. The cognitive limits make people prone to conspicuous consump-
tion because of the comparisons with others, with their previous situation, or
because of the consumption messages from the media and the advertising in-
dustry (Lane, 2000).
Summarizing, according to these three theories, the need to consume is part
of the human nature and people are subject to external forces pushing them to
consumption bulimia. This conclusion has depressive implications for policy-
making suggesting that no social policies can control the rat-race. However, a
more recent theory – building on the works by Polanyi (1968) and Hirsch (1976)
– provides an interpretation according to which people’s over-consumption orig-
inates from the way economic systems are organized, and in particular from
economic growth itself.
The “Negative Endogenous Growth” model (NEG) provides an explanation
of the Americans’ bulimic consumption integrating previous explanations in a
framework where economic growth is the outcome of a substitution process
absorbing environmental and social goods and providing substitute, expensive
market goods (Bartolini and Bonatti, 2003, 2008).
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2.1 The NEG model
The NEG model explains economic growth as the outcome of a substitution
process of free goods for private and expensive ones. Free goods are freely avail-
able to everybody, such as natural (e.g., air, water, sun, etc.) and social (e.g.,
trust, honesty, generosity, pro-social behaviors) resources. They are renewable
or unrestrictedly available to everybody. Many studies from social psychology,
sociology and economics proved that people benefit from their consumption. In
particular, there seems to be no doubts that people sharing good relationships
with others tend to be happier (Helliwell and Putnam, 2004; Helliwell, 2007).
The NEG model suggests that economic growth can result from the follow-
ing mechanism: in societies where free goods become scarcer, people can buy
substitute goods that are provided by the market. The only difference is that
these goods are no more free, but they are private and expensive. For example,
if cities become polluted, dangerous and unfriendly, it is possible to compensate
the lower quality of the living environment by buying a second house at the sea-
side or in the countryside. Similarly, it is possible to compensate for the lower
chances of social interactions by buying home entertainment theater to make
the time spent at home more pleasant. We can imagine various such examples.
Their common element is that people engage into a new layer of expenditures to
shelter from the degradation of the social and natural environment. This new
layer of expenditures is usually called defensive expenditures. Hence, also social
relationships – and more in general social capital – normally freely available in
a safe and enjoyable environment, are substituted by private goods provided
by the market. The consumption of free goods is not recorded in the national
accounts, whereas the consumption of private and expensive goods contributes
to economic growth. Moreover, to stand a higher private consumption people
need to increase their working effort further feeding economic growth.
Therefore, the erosion of free goods, such as social capital, increases the
demand for private substitute goods resulting in economic growth. Vice-versa,
economic growth further erodes free goods. On one side, increasing private
expenditures and working effort result in less time available for other activities,
affecting the opportunities to cultivate social relationships. For example, the
time available for friends and interpersonal relations decreases, thus lowering
social capital and, more in general, free goods. On the other side the widening
set of what is tradeable extends the sphere of influence of marketable goods and
services over a larger set of domains of people’s lives.3
Summarizing, economic growth produces negative externalities which in turn
further fuel the growth itself: people are pushed to consume private goods to
3Note that NEG model is an example of a macro-micro model (for a recent review, see: Opp,
2011). The erosion of free public goods (taking place on a macro-level) has a micro-level impli-
cation: individuals become less satisfied due to the availability of free goods. Individual-level
mechanism drives individuals to compensate low levels of satisfaction by engaging in defen-
sive expenditures, which brings about increased demand for income, resulting in longer work
hours and less time available for social relationships. These micro-level changes have profound
consequences at the macro-level: higher level of expenditures contributes to economic growth,
whereas low availability of time for nourishing social relationships has a macro consequence
of further erosion of free public goods. Additionally, increased level of defensive expenditures
at the micro level may – by fueling production – contribute to environmental pollution thus
leading to further erosion of free public goods. Thus, NEG model uses the mechanism-based
(at the same time: agent-based) approach to explain the macro-level change (for a relevant
discussion, see: Hedstro¨m, 2005; Opp, 2007, 2005).
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compensate for the decrease in well-being due to the erosion of the quality of
the living environment. This in turn feeds economic growth generating further
negative externalities and eroding free goods. In other words, according to the
NEG model, economic growth is the outcome of a self-augmentative process
in which media and advertisement are powerful tools to boost the substitution
process. This model predicts that the higher is the rate of economic growth,
the more is the work effort, the worst is the trend of people’s well-being and the
stronger is the erosion of free goods and particularly of social capital.
According to the NEG model, the American bulimic consumption is not the
outcome of some form of bounded rationality. It is rather the outcome of the
process of economic growth itself; it is the way modern economic systems are
organized that provides powerful incentives to over-consumption. They do so
by eroding what is free and common among people and by providing private
and expensive substitutes; the erosion of environmental and social goods pushes
people to engage in defensive expenditures which require an increasing working
effort and delivers less free time to devote to what people consider valuable in
their lives. In the words of Bartolini (2011), the NEG model explains how an
economic system creates expensive lives where less and less can be accessed for
free and, ultimately, how people turn into “formidable consumers and workers”.
2.2 NEG model VS Reality
Are the predictions of the NEG model met in reality? A set of recent studies
provides evidence supporting the predictions of the NEG model, namely:
• economic growth can be associated with the erosion of social capital;
• economic growth and the erosion of social capital are associated with de-
creasing well-being;
• relational poverty – the scarcity of social capital – predisposes to materi-
alistic orientations, growing consumption, and longer work hours.
In the following subsections we briefly describe this evidence.
2.2.1 Economic growth and social capital: the dream went sour
There seems to be no doubts that economic growth and social capital – defined as
“networks together with shared norms, values and understandings that facilitate
co-operation within or among groups” (OECD, 2001) – are positively correlated
both within and across countries (for evidence of positive cross-sectional corre-
lation, see: Knack and Keefer, 1997; La Porta et al., 1999; Whiteley, 2000; Zak
and Knack, 2001; Beugelsdijk et al., 2004; della Giusta, 2010). A large share of
the economic literature agrees that social capital acts as a catalyst of economic
interactions, making them safer, cheaper, and promoting growth. For example,
trust is seen as one of the elements of every commercial transaction, and Arrow
(1972) identified in the lack of trust the origin of at least some of the backward-
ness in the world. But there are also other reasons to believe that social capital
enhances economic growth: it reduces incentives for free-riding and moral haz-
ard, transaction costs, the “principal-agent” problem, and it solves collective
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action problems. Overall, higher social capital frees resources favouring new in-
vestments (Helliwell and Putnam, 1995; Knack and Keefer, 1997; Narayan and
Pritchett, 1997).
Hence, this extensive literature leaves no doubts that social capital is an
ingredient of economic growth. But what is the relationship between these two
variables over time? In other words, is economic growth accompanied by growing
social capital, and vice-versa? Only a few studies have explored this relationship
consistently finding that the love story between economic growth and social
capital over time has gone sour (Helliwell, 1996; Putnam, 2000; Sarracino, 2012;
Roth, 2009; Sarracino, 2013).
In particular, Sarracino (2013) using the World Values Survey (WVS) - Eu-
ropean Values Study (EVS) data-set, three different proxies of social capital4
and figures of GDP per capita shows that economic growth is negatively corre-
lated with the accumulation of social capital over time. This relationship holds
for various time-spans and samples of countries (see for example tab. 1).
Table 1: Correlations among long term trends – 10 years – of social
capital proxies and log of GDP per capita (standardized variables).
(1) (2) (3)
group membership trust in others civic cooperation
log of GDP −0.247∗∗ −0.255∗∗ −0.295∗∗
(−2.12) (−2.15) (−2.48)
Constant 0.719∗∗ −0.0285 −0.410∗
(3.44) (−0.11) (−1.74)
Observations 31 32 32
Adjusted R2 0.127 0.035 0.135
t statistics in parentheses
Country fixed effects are included in the model, but omitted for brevity.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
The number of observations for group membership is 31 because it is not possible
to compute the trend for Nigeria. Indeed, membership in groups and associations
was observed only once in 1995.
Source: Sarracino (2013), WVS-EVS integrated data-set.
These results suggest that economic growth can erode social capital and
some exploratory tests provide a possible interpretation: the negative relation-
ship among trends is driven by economic inequality (see tab. 2). In countries
with stronger increases of inequality, trends of social capital are negatively cor-
related with economic growth.5 On the contrary, in countries where economic
growth is accompanied by decreases or modest increases of inequality the same
relationship turns non significant.
4The three proxies are: trust in others, share of people participating in at least one group
or association and an index of social cooperation.
5The increase in inequality is considered strong when its growth rate is higher than the
median growth rate.
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Table 2: Correlations among long term trends – 10 years – of SC proxies
and log of GDP per capita in countries with rising inequality.
(1) (2) (3)
group membership trust in others civic cooperation
log of GDP −0.271∗∗∗ −0.142∗∗ −0.285∗∗∗
(−6.10) (−2.87) (−5.71)
Constant 0.315∗∗ −0.141 −0.104
(2.54) (−0.94) (−0.72)
Observations 12 12 12
Adjusted R2 0.286 0.002 0.231
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Source: Sarracino (2013), WVS-EVS integrated data-set and the Standardized
World Income Inequality Database.
2.2.2 The Easterlin paradox
The measurement and analysis of people’s well-being has a long-standing tra-
dition grounded in social psychology. This literature started developing in the
’70s and literally exploded after 2000 when subjective well-being increasingly
entered the vocabulary and the research agendas of other social sciences, in-
cluding economics (Bruni and Porta, 2007). This burgeoning literature refers
to subjective well-being as an individuals’ evaluation of their own well-being.
Subjective well-being, sometimes also referred to as “happiness” or “life satisfac-
tion”, is usually observed through answers to survey questions such as: “Taking
all things together, how happy would you say you are?” or “All things consid-
ered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?” (van Praag
et al., 2003). These measures proved to be reliable sources of information about
individual’s well-being and, in the last decades, have been employed in many
fields of applied social research, including testing the hypothesis that economic
growth improves the human lot.6
In his influential contribution, Easterlin (1974) clarified that despite the
steady economic growth experienced by Americans, over the last fifty years
people’s subjective well-being in the USA stagnated. More recently, this evi-
dence has been updated finding that in the long run economic growth is not
associated with subjective well-being (Easterlin and Angelescu, 2009). This
result, commonly known as the “Easterlin paradox”, has been strongly criti-
cized and underwent extensive scrutiny (Stevenson and Wolfers, 2008a; Sacks
et al., 2010; Veenhoven and Vergunst, 2013), however some more recent studies
have corroborated its existence (Easterlin et al., 2010; Bruni and Stanca, 2008;
6The reliability of these measures has been corroborated by experimental evidence from
several disciplines. For example, subjective well-being correlates with objective measures of
well-being such as the heart rate, blood pressure, duration of Duchenne smiles and neurological
tests of brain activity (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004a; van Reekum et al., 2007). Moreover,
subjective measures of well-being are strongly correlated with other proxies of subjective well-
being (Schwarz and Strack, 1999; Wanous and Hudy, 2001; Schimmack et al., 2010) and with
the judgements about the respondent’s happiness provided by friends, relatives or clinical
experts (Schneider and Schimmack, 2009; Kahneman and Krueger, 2006a; Layard, 2005).
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Becchetti et al., 2011; Bartolini and Sarracino, 2011).
Furthermore, there is evidence that social capital rather than GDP corre-
lates with people’s subjective well-being . For example, Bartolini and Sarracino
(2011) explore the relationship among these variables at aggregated level using
WVS-EVS data. The authors compare the trends of social capital – as proxied
by the participation of people in groups and associations – with the trends of
subjective well-being and of GDP per capita considering all the countries with
at least 15 years and three waves of observations, a reasonable long-term.
Results inform that in the long run the trend of group membership is signif-
icantly and positively correlated with subjective well-being (see fig. 4). This is
a very robust result since it holds even after controlling for the trend of GDP
per capita (see tab. 3). In the long run economic growth is not correlated with
the trends of subjective well-being , whereas the latter are positively correlated
with the trends of group membership.
Figure 4: Correlation among long-term trends of subjective well-being
and social capital ∗
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∗trends are computed regressing the proxies of subjective well-being and the share of
people members of at least one group or association over a time variable including all
the years when the dependent variable is observed. The β coefficients thus represent
the average yearly variation of the dependent variable as measured over a period
of at least 15 years. Trends are computed separately for each country and then
standardized to improve comparability among variables.
Source: Bartolini and Sarracino (2011), WVS-EVS integrated data-set.
This result is confirmed also after adopting another proxy of social capital:
social trust, available in the European Social Survey (ESS).7
7http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org
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Table 3: Long-term trends of proxies of subjective well-being over trends
of social capital and GDP.∗
(1) (2)
happiness life satisfaction
group membership 0.608∗∗ 0.330∗∗
(2.19) (3.58)
log GDP −0.0100 0.0447
(−0.07) (0.35)
Constant −0.690∗∗∗ −0.634∗∗∗
(−3.88) (−6.87)
Observations 27 27
Adjusted R2 0.302 0.087
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
∗All the variables are standardized.
Source: Bartolini and Sarracino (2011), WVS-EVS integrated data-set.
Table 4 reports the results of the correlations of subjective well-being trends
with the trends of social trust and of GDP per capita computed over a period
of at least 6 years, a medium rather than a long-term. Also in this case, the
coefficients associated with the trends of social capital are strongly and signif-
icantly associated with the trends of well-being, whereas GDP shows a weaker
– though less significant – correlation.
Of course this result might be driven by more developed countries, for which
basic needs have been met and people are finally free to care for something
else, such as social relationships. Evidence from poorer countries is scarce,
nonetheless two recent works provided some evidence in this regard. Easterlin
(2009) and Bartolini et al. (2012c) show that even if economic growth does
matter for people’s well-being in transition countries, also in this case social
relationships are important for subjective well-being (see table 5). Even though
the sample size is small, results are robust to the presence of influential points
and suggest that economic growth and social trust are comparably correlated
with the trends of well-being: over a period of at least 6 years the changes in
social capital are as important as economic growth for people’s well-being in
transition countries.
Summarizing, the evidence from two different data-sets providing inter-
nationally comparable information about social capital and well-being trends
across countries confirms that economic growth is only weakly associated with
the trend of well-being. The longer the perspective, the lower is the role of GDP
and the more social capital matters for well-being.
Some other studies tried to answer the same question adopting a within
country perspective and eventually panel data. Using data from the US Gen-
eral Social Survey over the last 30 years, Bartolini et al. (2013) show that a large
portion of the declining American happiness trend is explained by four forces
acting in contrasting directions. The first one is the increase in per capita in-
come, which positively affects subjective well-being , while the remaining three
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Table 4: Trends of subjective well-being over changes of the index of
social trust and trends of GDP.∗
(1) (2)
happiness life satisfaction
index of social trust 0.797∗∗∗ 0.731∗∗∗
(4.03) (8.06)
trend of log GDP 0.268∗∗ 0.323∗
(2.41) (2.02)
Constant −7.96e− 10 5.56e− 10
(−0.00) (0.00)
Observations 24 24
Adjusted R2 0.702 0.630
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
∗The index of social trust is the weighted average of the answers to questions about
whether most people can be trusted or not, whether other people try to take advantage
of others and whether people try to be helpful or rather looking for themselves. Each
of these three items ranges on a 0 to 10 scale, where the lowest category corresponds
to the worst judgement and the highest to the best one. Weights are obtained from
a factor analysis. All the trends are standardized. The sample includes transition
economies.
Source: Bartolini and Sarracino (2011), ESS data-set.
negatively affect happiness. The declining American well-being seems shaped
by three forces: 1) social comparisons, which erode approximately 2/3 of the
positive impact brought about by the increase in family income; 2) the decrease
in the confidence in institutions, a further component of social capital and 3) the
erosion of social capital whose magnitude is comparable to the one exerted by
social comparisons. The combined effect of these four forces on American sub-
jective well-being is negative: the effects of social comparisons, lower confidence
in institutions and the erosion of sociability more than offset the positive impact
of increasing income. Simulations reveal that, if social capital had stayed con-
stant at its 1975 levels, American subjective well-being would have been higher
today.
This evidence has been confirmed more recently also for two other countries:
Germany and China. Using the German Socio-Economic Panel and a wider
set of variables, Bartolini et al. (2012a) confirm previous results about the US
showing that the variation in the German subjective well-being between 1994
and 2007 is explained by the same forces shaping the American well-being. The
only difference, in this case, is that, during the last fifteen years, German social
capital has been increasing with an overall positive effect on subjective well-
being . Still, this study suggests that if social capital had not increased, the net
result for subjective well-being would have been the same as the American one.
More recently Easterlin et al. (2012) and Brockmann et al. (2009) have used
various datasets to explore the relationship among economic growth and well-
being also in China, one of the countries that experienced the most impressive
and sustained rate of economic growth over the last 20 years. It is reasonable
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Table 5: Trends of subjective well-being over changes of the index of
social trust and trends of GDP in transition countries.∗
(1) (2)
happiness life satisfaction
index of social trust 0.696∗∗ 0.727∗∗
(3.64) (5.24)
trend of log GDP 0.678∗∗ 0.683∗∗
(3.08) (7.98)
Constant −6.83e− 09 1.22e− 08
(−0.00) (0.00)
Observations 7 7
Adjusted R2 0.763 0.830
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
∗Data are retrieved from the European Social Survey. The index of social trust is
the weighted average of the answers to questions about whether most people can be
trusted or not, whether other people try to take advantage of others and whether
people try to be helpful or rather looking for themselves. Each of these three items
ranges on a 0 to 10 scale, where the lowest category corresponds to the worst judge-
ment and the highest to the best one. Weights are obtained from a factor analysis.
All the trends are standardized.
Source: Bartolini et al. (2012c), ESS data-set.
to expect that an average yearly economic growth of 9.7% results in a general
improvement of several social, economic and sanitary dimensions of people’s life
and on their well-being more in general. However, as illustrated in fig. 5 also in
this case it seems that economic growth missed to keep its promise of improving
the human lot.
Sarracino and Bartolini (2013) has looked into this paradoxical evidence us-
ing WVS data between 1990 and 2007 and the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition8.
In line with previous results, the author finds that the increased importance of
social comparisons largely contribute to explain the disappointing trend of well-
being. However, a second force also contributed to shaping the trend of Chinese
well-being: the erosion of social capital. In particular, some estimates suggest
that about 18.56% of the well-being loss in China is related to social capital.
Moreover, some computations suggest that if the latter stayed constant at its
level of 1990, the loss of well-being would have been 5.81% smaller. Hence, the
Chinese economic growth has been going hand in hand with the erosion of social
8This method allows to decompose the well-being gap between the initial and the final
year of observations identifying how much changes in the levels and in the coefficients of the
relevant variables explain the well-being gap. The Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition has been
developed in the early ’70s by Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) to study discrimination
between men and women in the labour market. Recently, it has been applied also to other
fields, including the literature on subjective well-being (Helliwell and Barrington-Leigh, 2010;
Becchetti et al., 2010). The decomposition method allows to study “group differences in any
(continuous and unbounded) outcome variable” (Jann, 2008, p. 1) by dividing the differential
of an outcome variable in two parts: the explained one, accounting for differences in observed
characteristics of the population and the unexplained one, measuring the differences in the
coefficients between two groups.
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Figure 5: Relationship between life satisfaction and income across time∗.
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indicators. Authors’ own elaboration.
capital, an increase in social comparisons and decreasing subjective well-being.
The evidence coming from both within and cross-country studies, various
techniques and different data-set supports the conclusion that, excepted tran-
sition economies, in the long run economic growth is negatively correlated not
only with social capital, but also with subjective well-being and these results
are consistent with the predictions from the NEG model.
2.2.3 Shiny objects: relational poverty, materialistic values and work
effort
Many studies, mainly from social psychology, confirm that poor relationships
predispose to consumption and higher work effort. This effect seems to be
mediated by the diffusion of materialistic values, i.e. a system of values in which
people tend to give higher importance to acquisition and possession of material
objects, which puts forward goals such as money, luxury goods and success,
while attaching less importance to affection, human relationships, solidarity,
civic engagement, and pro-social behaviors more in general (Kasser and Sheldon,
2000).
For example, it has been shown that the off-springs of less caring and nurtur-
ing parents have higher chances to develop materialistic values to compensate
for the insecurity due to the lack of affection and care (Williams et al., 2000).
This higher predisposition towards material goods and the quest for asserting
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oneself and identification with external objects pushes people towards conspic-
uous consumption. Consuming becomes a way to satisfy one’s own need of
identity and self-esteem (Kasser et al., 1995; Cohen and Cohen, 1996).
This relationship is further documented in a number of experiments of terror
management (Kasser and Sheldon, 2000). In these experiments, people are
randomly assigned to two different groups A and B. People in group A are
asked to write about their own death (the condition of terror), while people
in group B are asked to write about pleasant things, such as music. It turned
out that people primed with the terror condition exhibited significantly higher
levels of attachment to material goods supporting the idea that materialism is
an answer to insecurities. But the causal relationship goes also the other way
around: people giving more importance to material goods and consumption tend
to develop worst relationships with others, to be less generous, less empathetic
and to distrust others (Kasser, 2002). Hence, the “commoditization” of people’s
life comes at the expense of social relationships (Schwartz, 1994; Kasser, 2002;
Vohs et al., 2008). A number of experiments have confirmed this evidence and
added that people high in materialistic values tend to use others for instrumental
purposes (Cohen and Cohen, 1996; McHoskey, 1999; Sheldon et al., 2000; Kasser
and Grow Kasser, 2001).
These studies suggest that there is a reinforcing relationship between rela-
tional poverty and predisposition to material consumption. This evidence has
been recently confirmed in a study by Bartolini and Bilancini (2011). The
two authors have used data from the US General Social Survey to test the
bi-directional relationship between social capital – in the form of social partici-
pation and involvement – and the labor supply. The implicit hypothesis behind
this test is that work effort is necessary to afford a life where material consump-
tion is pivotal. The results suggest that relational poverty causes longer work
hours and the reason seems to be that individuals turn to work and money to
compensate for poor relational conditions. At the same time, results confirm
that those poor in time tend to develop poor relations thus feeding a vicious
circle where relational poverty causes time poverty and vice-versa.
In particular, figures suggest that a variation in average social participation
can significantly alter individual behaviours towards longer working hours and,
ultimately, lower social involvement. Bartolini and Bilancini (2011) estimate
that a reduction of 10% in average social involvement generates a 9% decrease
in individual participation in groups and associations and a 6.6% increase in
hours worked.
Hence the relational quality of the social context affects people’s labor supply
through its effect on individual social involvement. This is consistent with the
predictions of the NEG model: a two-way causation between social relationships
and the labor supply is compatible with the hypothesis that the decline in social
capital might have resulted in an increase in hours worked. Vice-versa, the
increase of the latter may have contributed to the erosion of social capital. In
both cases the outcome has been economic growth.
There is also evidence that materialism, although it may be defined as a
belief that well-being is enhanced through possession of things, is inherently
related to low levels of subjective well-being (for a review of empirical evidence
see: Burroughs and Rindfleisch, 2002).
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3 Can it happen again?
In the previous section we have pointed out some key dimensions of social life
which characterize the NEG-type economic growth. In the next section we look
at how social capital, subjective well-being , materialism, leisure time and hours
worked and consumption have changed across countries and over time to check
how widespread are the NEG mechanisms. The final aim is to show that it is not
only possible, but also desirable to set up an early warning system where these
dimensions are consistently monitored to inform about the countries where the
signs of possible new crisis are stronger.
3.1 Trends of social capital
The observation that social capital in the US is declining is currently a recurrent
theme in the social sciences. Putnam (1995) lists the decrease of voting turnout,
attending meetings, political rallies or speeches, trust in the government, and
membership and activity in organizations. However, he also notes that these
trends have been partly counteracted by the growth of feminist, environmental
and retirees organizations, as well as small self-help groups. In a similar vein,
Bartolini et al. (2013) report negative trends for various dimensions of American
social capital, including: frequency of marriages and separations, social trust,
frequency of socializing with neighbours, and confidence in a range of institutions
(the only institution not experiencing a decreasing confidence is the Supreme
Court).
Concerning Europe, a recent analysis of trends and levels of associational
participation in Europe 1980-2002 did not show any clear increasing nor de-
creasing trend of membership (Morales, 2004). However, other works are more
conclusive. Adam (2008) observed trends of generalized trust and membership
in voluntary organizations (1980–2000) and found a non-decreasing trend of
social capital in Europe, despite some signs of decline. The downward trend
concerned mainly social trust, whereas the trend of involvement in associations
was more heterogeneous, but on average positive. Similarly, Sarracino (2010)
observed social trust, membership in organizations and participation in volun-
tary activities, as well as trust in institutions over the period 1980-2000. The
author documents mainly positive trends, in particular for social relationships.
Only Great Britain stood out with declining trends of many proxies of social cap-
ital. Moreover, the analysis of trust in institutions made clear that all observed
European countries were affected by a crisis of some institutions. In a more
recent analysis using longer time span (1980-2005) Sarracino (2012) shows that
social capital was increasing in Australia, Canada, Japan and western Europe,
despite the decline of confidence in the judicial system, religious institutions,
parliament, and civil service (with the exception of Italy, where the trends were
mainly positive).
3.2 Trends of well-being
A broad literature documents that despite the economic growth of recent decades,
the subjective well-being in the US has been declining. The evidence concerns
periods: 1972-2005 (Stevenson and Wolfers, 2008a), 1972-91 (Easterlin, 1995),
and 1972-98 (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004b). However, these studies are still
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not conclusive. For example, Stevenson and Wolfers (2008b), analysing data
for period 1972-2006, identified flat trends of subjective well-being for men and
declining ones for women. On the contrary, Easterlin (2005) found flat trends
of happiness for period 1972-2002. This picture becomes clearer when we move
from subjective to objective measures of well-being. In this case, the worrying
trends pointed out by Easterlin (2005) are paralleled by the strong increase of
mental diseases and the use of anti-depressant drugs (see tables 6 and 7, see
also Bartolini, 2013).
Table 6: Mental illness around the world∗
Country % suffering Nation % suffering
United States 26.4 Ukraine 20.5
Great Britain 23.0 France 18.4
Autralia 23.0 Colombia 17.8
New Zealand 20.7 Lebanon 16.9
Netherlands 14.9 China (Beijing) 9.1
Mexico 12.2 Japan 8.8
Belgium 12.0 Italy 8.2
Spain 9.2 Nigeria 4.7
Germany 9.1 China (Shanghai) 4.3
∗ Source: James (2007)
Table 7: Antidepressants consumption, 2000 and 2010∗
Country 2000 2010 % increase
Estonia 6 16 147%
Hungary 14 26 96%
Slovak Republic 9 29 237%
Italy 20 (2001) 40 104%
Netherlands 31 (2001) 41 29%
Czech Republic 10 42 329%
Luxembourg 36 (2003) 45 24%
Germany 21 47 126%
France 40 50 (2009) 26%
Norway 41 56 37%
Spain 28 61 117%
United Kingdom 38 66 75%
Belgium 39 69 78%
Finland 36 69 94%
Sweden 48 76 59%
Portugal 33 79 142%
Denmark 35 84 141%
Iceland 71 101 43%
∗ Source: OECD (2012)
The evidence for Europe is different: even though the trends differ across
countries, it seems safe to conclude that the trend of well-being in Europe are
increasing (Sacks et al., 2010; Sarracino, 2012).
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3.3 Trends of materialism
Despite the expectation that materialistic attitudes should decrease over time
giving way to post-materialistic orientation which emphasizes social solidarity
(Inglehart and Flanagan, 1987), materialistic values in the US are on the rise.
Materialism, as usually addressed by positive psychology, is a system of personal
values ascribing great importance in life to extrinsic motivations and low prior-
ity to intrinsic motivations (Twenge and Kasser, 2013). Observational studies
dating back to the 1970s document the increase of materialism as a life goal
(Easterlin and Crimmins, 1991): the percentage of university students who be-
lieved that “outstanding economic condition” was an essential goal in life almost
doubled between 1970 and 1995 (Myers and Diener, 1997). Also the popular-
ity of college majors leading to highly paid jobs increased. A similar change
occurred also among older generations (Easterlin and Crimmins, 1991). The
percentage of Americans who declared that it was important “to have a lot of
money” or “to have a job that pays more than the average” grew almost by half
between the 1970s and 1990s (Schor, 1998).
This evidence is at odds with previous results by Inglehart and colleagues
documenting a shift of the American society towards more post-materialist val-
ues. However, we argue that such difference is only apparent for at least two rea-
sons. First, subsequent research clarified that materialist and post-materialist
values define two distinct dimensions that can co-exhist (Bean and Papadakis,
1994; Hellevik, 1993; Van Deth, 1983). Having post-materialist goals does not
necessarily imply the abandonment of materialist ones (Braithwaite et al., 1996).
In other words growing post-materialist values do not mean decreasing mate-
rialist ones. Hence the trends that we document are not inconsistent with the
trends documented by Inglehart. Second, we emphasize that the definition of
materialism adopted in this literature is different from the one referred to by
Inglehart and colleagues. While the former is grounded on the distinction be-
tween intrinsic and extrinsic motivations, the latter neglects this distinction: the
materialistic values indicated by Inglehart are extrinsically motivated, but the
post-materialistic ones are not necessarily intrinsically motivated. For example,
one can be favorable to freedom of speech or to greater participation in political
and economic life (post-materialist values) not because he/she considers such
issues intrinsically important, but for their positive social spillovers, such as
having more effective decisions or a more stable society (extrinsic motivation).
Hence, the different definition of materialism adopted in present study can also
explain the apparent discrepancy between the studies reviewed here and the
results by Inglehart and colleagues. Indeed, a recent study by Twenge and
Kasser (2013), analysing the trends of materialism of a large representative set
of American students and adopting the same definition of positive psychologists,
confirms that the trends of materialism increased over the last thirty years.
Growing materialism brought a modest decrease of public interest and a
sharp decline of the goal of personal self-fulfillment (Easterlin and Crimmins,
1991). An overall decrease of political involvement, and a conservative shift in
political beliefs followed. In fact, the trends of materialism mirror the reversed
patterns of social capital: as materialism rises, social trust falls (Rahn and
Transue, 1998). Also among American youth, the levels of social trust seriously
eroded.
In sharp contrast to the US, in Europe materialism is declining. Bartolini
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and Sarracino (2013) document that many proxies of materialism are decreas-
ing in France, Spain, Italy, Germany, Great Britain and Sweden. Similarly,
Abramson and Inglehart (1992) document the growth of post-materialism in 8
Western European societies. Many factors might have contributed to shaping
these divergent trends. It is plausible, for example, that in the US the increasing
pervasiveness of market relationships in some spheres of social life (e.g. health-
care, education and pensions) increased the overall feeling of insecurity and led
to the growth of materialist attitudes (Bartolini, 2013).
3.4 Trends of leisure time and hours worked
The US are one of the countries with long working time (Fleck, 2009). This is
rooted in legal regulations: for instance, about one fourth of businesses in the
US does not provide any paid leave to their employees. However, there is no
agreement on whether the trends of hours worked have increased or not. Part of
the literature (e.g. Schor, 1992) states that average working time of Americans
is increasing, due to, on one hand, the declining strength of labour unions which
in the 1940s have won the 40-hour work week; on the other hand – due to the
diffusion of materialist values and the excessive focus on consumer goods, which
created the need of earning and working more.
Another part of the literature points out a stable trend of working hours
and growth of leisure time (6-9 hours for men and 4-8 hours for women in
period 1965-2003 see: Aguiar and Hurst, 2007), resulting from the decrease of
housework hours. According to a study by Robinson (1997), this trend has
been driven by growing size of the non-employed population (especially men on
early retirement and students) and decreasing size of groups performing a lot of
housework (due to postponing of marriage and parenting age).
However, Jacobs and Gerson (2001) claim that even without increase of
working time the American employment poses new threats to family life. A
shift from male-breadwinner to dual-earner couples led to emergence of a group
of households where there is no one left to do housework. The distribution of
work has changed: even if the average working time did not grow, a new segment
of employed couples, working over 100 hours per week emerged during recent
decades. These are mostly the highly educated persons occupying prestigious
position in the labour market. Additionally, the situation likely worsened also
for employees whose working time did not increase, because lower on the job
flexibility made work-life balance more difficult (Jacobs and Gerson, 2001).
The trend observed in European countries (Belgium, Denmark, France, Ger-
many, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Italy, and UK) was again strikingly
different. Whereas in mid-1970s European men worked 5-10% more than their
American counterparts, after the year 2000 they were working 25-30% less (Bar-
tolini, 2013). This is due, in part, to legal changes. European countries recently
adopted the European Union’s mandates on working-time restrictions (limiting
overtime and establishing 4 weeks vacation rights), which reduced the working
time particularly in the UK and Italy (OECD, 2012).
An interesting case is the Netherlands, which in 2000 adopted a national
legislation allowing employees to choose the number of hours they want to work.
This legislation increased the size of part-time employment, which had begun
to grow already in the 1980s. This example shows that voluntary maximizing
consumption and working time is not the only choice; on the contrary, it seems
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that persons who have a choice may also free-willingly reduce their working time,
even though it implies lowering of earnings and less possibilities to consume
(OECD, 2012).
3.5 Trends of consumption
In a famous book “The overspent American” Schor (1998) claims that people in
contemporary US spend too much: more than is fiscally prudent, more than they
did in the past, and more than they realize. Indeed, the debt of US households
grew much faster than the wages, more than doubling the ratio of total debt
to wages from late 1970’s to 2008 (Bartolini, 2013), and the US saving rate has
declined because growth in disposable income has not kept pace with growth in
consumer spending (Peach and Steindel, 2000, see also fig 6).
Among the factors standing behind this change, Schor (1998) sees mainly
the “competitive consumption”, fuelled by the growing income inequality and
domination of media which advertise the lifestyle of the top 20% as an example
to follow. Moreover, materialistic values were shown to strongly predict com-
pulsive buying among youth in the UK (Dittmar, 2005). Another source might
have been defensive expenditures, aimed at protecting individuals against the
decrease of social capital: private entertainment (e.g. home entertainment sys-
tems) to replace the declining social relationships, and defensive expenditures
(police and guards, lawyers, work supervisors) to compensate for the loss of
trust and security (Bartolini, 2013).
In some European countries savings rates are also declining. In the 1980’s
the saving ratios in OECD countries were generally lower than in the 1960’s and
the 1970’s (Dean et al., 1989). Despite this, household savings rates are much
higher in Europe than in the US (Bo¨rsch-Supan and Brugiavini, 2001, see also
fig. 6).
4 Conclusion
After many years of economic growth, after the new economy boom and the
rising of new international economic and financial powers, the 2008 will be
remembered as the year of the most severe crisis after 1929, the umpteenth one
since the beginning of the ’90s up to now.
The triggering causes of such a large crisis affecting the heart of the inter-
national economic setting have been widely analyzed and debated: the crisis
was the result of the interaction of a condition of extremely easy credit to con-
sumers, new financial tools and poor institutional and regulatory framework.
This mix allowed the spread of a deep speculative bubble and the proliferation
of a situation of financial opacity which became suddenly evident when the bub-
ble exploded. The impossibility to tell good bonds from “toxic” ones resulted in
a dramatic increase of the interest rates and in credit contraction. Through this
channel the financial crisis passed on the “real” economy with all its well-known
dramatic consequences for the well-being of people.
However, this explanation neglects an important point: people’s propensity
to consume. At the heart of the mechanism that led to the crisis there is
the accumulation of a huge private debt. The much blamed financial tools
where only the means that allowed the Americans to get indebted beyond their
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Figure 6: Household net saving rate∗
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possibilities. But at the root of the accumulation of the debt is the people’s need
to consume. A more exhaustive explanation of the crisis requires to understand
the bulimic need of consumption that pushed the Americans to get indebted
in order to foot the bill of higher levels of consumption that were already the
highest in the world. In other words, what did push the most aﬄuent people in
the world to consume beyond their possibilities?
Missing to understand this point undermines all the attempts to regulate
the markets and to limit the risks of future default without curing the sickness
they are meant for.
The recent development of social sciences and, particularly the research on
the determinants of people’s well-being, allows to look from new perspectives
into people’s behaviours and preferences, including the consumption behaviours.
In particular, the Negative Endogenous Growth (NEG) model provides a frame-
work to explain the American over-consumption in terms of relational poverty.
This theory suggests that people’s well-being asks not only for material needs,
but also for further aspects coming from the delicate connection of human rela-
tionships with others and with the surrounding environment. Neglecting these
aspects reduces people’s well-being and increases the quest for material con-
sumption generating formidable consumers. Hence, according to this model, the
need to consume is an answer to the unhappiness and to the relational poverty
of modern societies. As such it does not concern only the U.S., where it takes
extreme forms; it also affects, at various degree of intensity, other developed
and developing countries.
This paper reviewed the evidence supporting this interpretation and de-
scribed the trends of some key indicators of relational poverty, increasing ma-
terialism, well-being and consumption across developed countries. Our work
shows that these indicators could meaningfully be adopted to monitor people’s
behaviours towards consumption. Overall, social capital and subjective well be-
ing steadily decreased in the US, whereas materialistic orientations, consump-
tion and hours worked increased. In the same period some European countries
experienced more encouraging trends, showing an increase of subjective well-
being and of several dimensions of social capital and a decrease in materialistic
orientations and in hours worked. A notable exception in this picture is Great
Britain, whose trends resemble more closely the US picture.
Obviously, this is only a preliminary effort: a more comprehensive assessment
would require more extensive figures observed in a more consistent way. Rather,
we show that this exercise is feasible and would deliver important information.
According to the NEG interpretation, economic systems – such as the American
one – are naturally prone to economic crisis because they produce opulence from
the erosion of what is free and common, thus feeding unhappiness, relational
poverty, proneness to materialism and an increasing need to consume. Economic
crisis are the limit to the otherwise infinite people’s attempt to consume. To
prevent events such as the shock of 2008 it is necessary to control all those
forces that pushed the Americans, and all western societies more in general, to
over-consumption.
There is no doubt that these are necessary, but not sufficient conditions for
the on-set of a crisis. In 2008 these aspects dangerously interacted with a weak
regulatory system and an infinite possibility to borrow money resulting in the
crisis. Hence, this work suggests two main conclusions:
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1. to reduce the risk of future shocks, we should sensibly reform the way
modern economies are organized. In the light of what happened in the US
– but also in United Kingdom and more recently in China – the higher
economic performance of some countries compared to others is the sign
of systems that are less compatible with people’s well-being and their
relational needs and more prone to crisis;
2. some of the indicators we have monitored can be used as part of an early
warning mechanism to alert in case one or more of the factors leading
to the on-set of the crisis reaches worrying levels. This might be readily
applicable. For example, some analysts have warned about a new real
estate bubble growing in UK thanks to the extremely low interest rates
from the Bank of England (Iodice and Palma, 2013). Many fear that this
might result in a new crash. How severe can it be? It is hard to predict,
but we know that it will depend on how much UK will result indebted with
the rest of the world: its market is relatively small, but its economy is in
many regards similar to the American one and many signs suggest that
a NEG mechanism might be at work also there. Monitoring the trends
of well-being, social relationships and materialism of British people could
help to gauge how severe is the risk of a new crisis.
Concluding, the development of the literature on subjective well-being allows
to tell a richer story concerning the last economic and financial crisis highlighting
some of the weak points of current economic systems. The deep crisis that
shocked the world economy represents a sign that current world economic setting
asks for a reform. Hence, the task of social scientists should be to contribute
to reshape it towards more sustainable and durable goals than just economic
growth. Thanks to the new development of the economic theory, future policies
can consider their effects for both the economy and the society at the same time
in a more effective and comprehensive way.
The last economic crisis represented a tragedy for millions of people, but it is
also a great occasion for economists to re-discover humankind and its well-being
as the ultimate goal of economic policies. People’s well-being asks not only for
material needs, but also for further aspects coming from the delicate connection
of human relationships with others and the surrounding environment.
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